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using such weapons. Each chapter is a
self-contained unit that ends with a separate bibliography and a list of applicable
treaties. This approach is particularly
valuable for a reader who wants to review quickly only one of the subjects
covered.

Whether one agrees or not with
Koplow’s conclusions, Death by Moderation is a valuable addition to the literature because it forces the reader to
think about a number of important issues that will be around for the predictable future.

The author does a good job presenting
both sides of the issues surrounding
these weapons. He clearly views these
issues from a legal, arms-control perspective, as opposed to that of someone
who might have actually to employ the
weapons in combat. This is hardly surprising, given the author’s background.
Koplow is a professor of law at Georgetown University Law Center and director of the Center for Applied Legal
Studies. He has the added credentials of
service in both the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency and the Department of Defense.

THEODORE L. GATCHEL

A quick look at chapter 6, on smart
antipersonnel mines, illustrates the
book’s strengths (which are major) and
its weaknesses (which are minor). The
scenario is hypothetical and involves a
country called “Kafiristan.” In my view,
such cases are less powerful than his
historical ones, such as the use of
precision-guided bombs against heavily
defended bridges in North Vietnam.
This chapter provides a useful primer
on land-mine warfare, including important definitions explaining selfdestructing, self-neutralizing, and
self-deactivating mines. It also discusses
the two current, but competing, treaties
on the subject: the 1980 United Nations
Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons, which was signed by the
United States, and the more restrictive
1997 Ottawa Treaty, which the United
States did not sign.
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Thies, Wallace J. Why NATO Endures. New York:
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2009. 321pp. $90

The study of alliances is central to our
understanding of international relations. Wallace Thies, a reputable NATO
scholar, argues that the “iron law of coalitions”—that alliances are formed to
resist enemies and do not outlast
them—must be rethought because of
NATO’s record-breaking performance
over the past six decades. The title, Why
NATO Endures, therefore understates
the sweeping conclusion of this concise
and readable essay.
Thies’s rhetorical technique is to document how contemporaneous observers
have characterized six tumultuous incidents in NATO’s existence as lifethreatening crises, then to evaluate with
the clarity of hindsight the alliance’s
self-healing tendencies. In each case,
NATO emerges as a stronger alliance
with improved vitality.
The analysis draws from both historical
sources and political-science research to
contrast traditional alliances with
NATO. Thies’s principal points are
both simple and profound. The European alliances of past centuries were cut
from different cloth than was the North
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Atlantic alliance. Early alliances seemed
designed to be transitory. There was no
need for cooperation, integration, preparation, or even friendship among
Bismarckian-era allies in a multipolar
world. Offensive wars were fought for
territory and treasure. However, this
situation was turned on its head when
two superpowers developed alliance
systems in an ideological struggle where
contesting armies had thermonuclear
weapons and needed to be ready to
fight for national survival on a moment’s notice. Further, NATO’s members were liberal democracies empowered to take positions independent of
the United States on any number of issues and were willing to air these differences in public.
The author’s well-informed encapsulation of the six “fatal” crises that NATO
has weathered over the years provides
scholars and interested general readers
insight, perspective, and juicy anecdotes. The author’s technique of laying
out the problem in each case and following with “what actually happened”
makes for a series of intriguing and illuminating vignettes in diplomatic history. Watching them unfold in real
time, without the benefit of opened archives and clear hindsight, was not
nearly as satisfying or rewarding.
A second cavil with the book’s title
(and the more important one) is that it
is conclusive only in the past tense. The
book is certainly a persuasive explanation as to why NATO endured. It offers
a plausible countertheory for the creation of successful and enduring alliances. However, only one of the crises
addresses the post–Cold War world in
which we find ourselves today. Indeed,
many of the circumstances that
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attended NATO’s creation and sustenance have either vanished or are eroding. Its bête noire (Russia) has ceased to
be NATO’s enemy for two decades, and
the anxieties created by imminent destruction have been replaced by lesser
threats, such as transnational terrorism
and crime. It remains to be seen if the
“self-healing tendencies” of democracies are sufficient to enable NATO to
endure in an entirely different kind of
world. The reader will benefit from
Thies’s well argued discussion of this
point.
THOMAS FEDYSZYN
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Wheeler, Winslow T., and Lawrence J. Korb. Military Reform: An Uneven History and an Uncertain
Future. Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press,
2009. 256pp. $24.95

In Military Reform, two national security experts reflect on initiatives intended to reform defense planning
across the entire enterprise. For decades
Winslow Wheeler and Lawrence Korb
have observed, studied, and participated in defense reform, gaining a
weathered perspective on the ideas,
events, and actions taken by national
security organizations within government. This work describes the conditions necessary or common in the
national security environment in cases
where individuals or institutions have
exhibited interest in reform.
Wheeler and Korb review the issues that
underpinned defense reform initiatives
over several decades. They describe the
actions of key individuals who championed reform ideas and the issues and
stakes of those who opposed or resisted.
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